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Abstract
Tellabs v. Makor Issues and Rights is potentially the most
significant securities litigation decision by the Supreme
Court in years. It was hoped that the Supreme Court would
clear up what it meant to give a "strong inference of the
required state of mind" when pleading securities fraud
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA"). This Note suggests that the Supreme Court
decision fell short of this hope.
The standard the Supreme Court established in
Tellabs is significant because it is the language that every
litigator must now use to establish a securities fraud claim.
However, the Supreme Court took a neutral stance in
declaring:
"To qualify as "strong"... we hold, an inference of
scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-
it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent."
This Note looks at how the securities community
reacted to the Tellabs decision, noting that both potential
plaintiffs and potential defendants believed that the ruling
came down in their favor, and that many commentators
acknowledged that the ruling left more to be desired.
I. INTRODUCTION
"In our view, public companies today must be more mature and
sophisticated, have a more substantial administrative infrastructure and
expend substantially more resources simply to comply with the increased
securities regulatory burden."' This seems to be the issue of the hour in
I FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (April 23, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
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American business. Are we over-regulating our corporations? Are we
leaving our shareholders out to dry?
One way to affect the ease of litigation is to change the pleading
requirements. Generally, in a complaint at the beginning of litigation, there
only needs to be a "short and plain statement" alleging the wrongdoing.2
For securities litigation, the standard has always been a little higher. As
Christopher Keller and Michael Stocker explained, "[u]nder the former
regime established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
plaintiffs alleging fraud were required to plead with specificity the
'circumstances constituting fraud,' but could plead the requisite state of
mind on a simple notice basis." 3 Securities pleadings standards have been a
source of confusion among lawyers and judges.
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").4 In addition to adding several requirements, this
Act placed one large hurdle at the start of any litigation for the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs in a securities fraud action cannot obtain discovery until the Court
has first decided if it is going to dismiss the complaint. 5 This is just one
example of the serious regulations that Congress placed on both sides of the
recent securities litigation. The PSLRA left room for interpretation.
In June 2007, the Supreme Court attempted to define the level of
scienter that a pleading must allege for a lOb-5 action to make it past the
pleading stage. The case, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights6 sets a standard
for what judges need to look for to determine if a fraud allegation will make
it to the next level of litigation. As of March 17, 2008, more than one
hundred decisions in the lower federal courts have referred to the Tellabs
decision. 7 This case is an important part of the future of securities litigation
and it will change the manner in which both the plaintiffs and the
defendants approach a securities lawsuit.
This Note attempts to synthesize what has happened since the
ruling, how the securities community has reacted, and what the fears for the
future are from the eyes of potential litigants. Tellabs certainly changed the
definition of "strong inference," but it left a lot to be desired. This Note
first summarizes the reactions to Tellabs, and looks at whether the ruling
helps or hurts corporations. This Note then attempts to illuminate some of
the issues that remain despite Tellabs. Finally, this Note looks at Justice
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (2).
3 Christopher J. Keller & Michael W. Stocker, 'Tellabs': PSLRA Pleading Test
Comparative, Not Absolute, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 2007, at 4.
4 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 48 Stat. 88 (codified at 15 U.S.C.§§
77z-78u (2006)).
5 James Spellman, A 'Right' Move by US Supreme Court in Fraud Cases, FINANCIAL
ADVISER, Aug. 16, 2007, at 3.
6 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2007).
7 John P. Stigi III & Martin White, Courts Interpret 'Tellabs, NAT'L. L. J., March 17,
2008.
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Stevens' dissent to the Tellabs opinion as a potentially more coherent
alternative to the majority opinion.
II. BACKGROUND
There has been a constant debate about the ease with which
shareholders can bring lawsuits against the company in which they own
shares.8 By the early 1990s Congress saw that the amount and cost of this
type of securities litigation was getting out of control, and in 1995 Congress
passed into law the PSLRA.9 The purpose of the PSLRA was two-fold:
Congress wanted "to curb frivolous lawyer driven litigation while
preserving investor's ability to recover on meritorious claims."' Congress
used the PSLRA as a vehicle to reduce the large quantity and ensuing
expense of litigation while attempting to maintain shareholders' power to
bring suit.
One of the ways the PSLRA made it more difficult for shareholders
to file frivolous lawsuits was by tightening the requirements for pleadings
in securities litigation." Corporations faced with lawsuits from their
shareholders regarding a lOb-5 violation can file a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.' 2 These motions suggest that the plaintiff has not offered enough
in the pleadings to meet the heightened requirements for a lOb-5 cause of
action. The best outcome for corporations is to end the litigation with a
12(b)(6) decision.
Thus, for most securities lawsuits, judges are faced with
determining whether or not the case should proceed to trial based solely on
the plaintiffs' pleadings and the defendants' motion to dismiss. Prior to the
1995 PSLRA, this was an extremely contentious issue.' 3  As Justice
Ginsberg wrote in Tellabs, "Setting a uniform pleading standard for § 10(b)
actions was among Congress' objectives when it enacted the PSLRA."' 4
Today's PSLRA has made great strides in regulating the 1Ob-5 lawsuits.
8 See generally Marilyn F. Johnson, et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON & ORG. 627 (2007) and
Mary Ann Frantz, Chair, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation: The
Subcommittee on Annual Review, Committee of Federal Regulation of Securities, ABA
Section of Business Law, 62 Bus. LAW. 1065 (2007).
9 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-78u (2006); See
also, Marc H. Folladori, Protecting Forward-Looking Statements: The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Other Safeguards, PRAC. L. INST., January
4-5, 2007.
10 Mark D. Wood, Liability for Securities Law Violations, PRAC. L. INST.
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 2007, Sept-Dec. 2007.
" Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504.
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
'3 Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2508.
14 Id.
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Under PSLRA, a plaintiff must clearly establish two points. First,
the plaintiff must "specify each statement [made by the corporation] alleged
to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading."' 5 Second, the plaintiffs must "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind" (emphasis added).' 6 It is this second requirement for the
pleading that has given courts across the nation so much trouble. Congress
failed to indicate what they thought constituted a "strong inference." Thus,
circuit courts across the nation have been making their own determinations.
The split among the circuits made a big impact on whether a
corporation was going to win or lose their motion to dismiss. 17 The Second
Circuit claims that in the 1995 PSLRA, Congress adopted language that the
Second Circuit had used in Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.' 8 Believing
that Congress intended to adopt their approach to "strong inference," the
Second Circuit has stood strictly by their determination that a "strong
inference" is shown if the plaintiff pleaded that the members of the
defending corporation had "either a motive and opportunity or strong
circumstantial evidence of recklessness or conscious misbehavior."'
' 9
However, this is the view of just one circuit.
The Second Circuit's view appears to be the "middle road" in
pleading standards. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits created the polar ends
of what is sufficient to prove a "strong inference" of scienter. The Sixth
Circuit ruled that "plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of
competing inferences," when determining if the complaint is sufficient to
impose scienter. The Sixth Circuit clarified that their definition does not
mandate that the strong inference be "irrefutable., 20 This was a very strict
and corporation friendly standard that suggested plaintiffs could prevail
only after a defendant's motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs complaint
suggested that the fact that the defendant acted with scienter was the most
convincing reason that he so acted. For the Sixth Circuit, the allegations in
the complaint had to be more convincing than any other possibility to get to
the next stage of the litigation.
In Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, the Seventh Circuit took the
opposite approach. The Seventh Circuit ruled, "We will allow the
complaint to survive if it alleges facts from which, if true, a reasonable
'5 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006).
16 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). For lOb-5 violations, the "required state of mind" is
scienter. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b),
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
'7 See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
18 Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
19 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000) (Again, the required state of mind
is "scienter," or "intent to deceive.").
20 Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent." 2 1 This
standard is low, and thus friendly to the shareholder. A plaintiff can allege
facts, which have to be taken as true,22 and if any reasonable person could
believe that the defendant acted with scienter, the motion to dismiss would
be denied. This juxtaposition, established by the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits, is what sent Tellabs to the Supreme Court. 3 Securities litigation
needed a pleading standard that was clearer as to how to establish that a
member of the defending corporation acted with scienter. The Tellabs
opinion from June 21, 2007 is the Supreme Court's most recent ruling that
tries to carry out the congressionally imposed motives of the PSLRA.
A. The Tellabs Decision
The facts of Tellabs are fairly typical of lOb-5 litigation. Tellabs,
Inc. is a "manufacturer of specialized equipment used in fiber optic cable
networks. 24  The executives at Tellabs, Inc., specifically CEO Richard
Notebaert, made statements between December 2000 and June 2001 that
indicated the products and business were doing very well.25 Notebaert
stressed that the TITAN 5500 and the TITAN 6500 were thriving and in
high demand.26 For example, the plaintiffs allege, "[d]uring a conference
call on March 8, 2001, in response to an analyst's inquiry whether Tellabs
was experiencing 'any weakness there at all' as to the TITAN 5500,
Notebaert stated: 'No, we're not. We're still seeing that product continue to
maintain its growth rate; it's still experiencing strong acceptance."' 27 Then,
on June 19, 2001, Tellabs, Inc. announced a third reduction in their
quarterly projections and said it was because the TITAN 5500 was not
selling well.28  Shareholders filed a class action suit alleging fraudulent
conduct by the executives of Tellabs, Inc.29 The District Court dismissed
the plaintiffs complaint on Tellabs's motion to dismiss suggesting that "the
complaint failed adequately to allege that the defendants met the scienter
standard for securities fraud, which requires that they likely intended 'to
21 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006).
22 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507,
U.S. 163, 164 (1993).
23 Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506.
24 Makor, 437 F.3d at 591.
251d. at 593; see also, www.tellabs.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (Tellabs
claims that it "design[s], develop[s], deploy[s] and support[s] solutions for telecom
services providers worldwide.").
26 Makor, 437 F.3d at 593.
27 Brief for Respondents at 7, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 127 S. Ct.
2499, 2504, (2007).
28 Makor, 437 F.3d at 593.
29 1d. at 591-92.
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deceive, manipulate, or defraud."' 30 The Seventh Circuit reversed in part
and ruled that a plaintiffs complaint will survive if "any reasonable person
could believe that the defendant acted with scienter.'1 In light of the
Seventh Circuit's ruling and the dichotomy between the Circuits on this
issue, the Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari to determine "whether,
and to what extent, a court must consider competing inferences in
determining whether a securities fraud complaint gives rise to a 'strong
inference' of scienter."
32
The Court attempted to lay out a more uniform standard for judges
to use in determining what is an adequate pleading of scienter. The
Supreme Court took several of the circuit court decisions into consideration
and ruled that, "[t]o qualify as 'strong' . . . we hold, an inference of scienter
must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent."
33
The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's ruling and stated that
"neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals had the opportunity to
consider the matter in light of the prescriptions we announce today."3 4 The
Court remanded the case for further proceedings.35
This ruling was highly anticipated and was expected to clarify the
pleading standards.3 6 While it certainly garnered a lot of attention after the
June 21, 2007 ruling, it would be a stretch to conclude that the scienter
pleading standards have been "clarified."
III. IS THis RULING CORPORATION-FRIENDLY OR WAS IT A VICTORY FOR
THE SHAREHOLDERS?
The first indication that pleading standards were not clarified is that
both sides thought they won. Some analysts and practitioners suggest that
Tellabs was another example of the Roberts Court's kindness toward
businesses.3 7 The other side adamantly argues that, despite what Tellabs,
Inc. claims, this was actually a decision making pleadings easier for
shareholders.3 8 It is possible the reason Tellabs was a successful decision is
30 Id. at 593.
31 Id. at 602.
32 Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506.
31 Id. at 2505-06.
34 1d. at 2513.
35 Id. See infra, page 12 for an analysis of the Tellabs remand ruling.
36 See Bruce Ericson, Supreme Court to Clarify Securities Fraud Pleading Standards,
MONDAQ, Jan. 24, 2007, and Brad S. Karp & Christopher Hyde Giampapa, Supreme
Court to Decide PSLRA Pleading Standard, N.Y.L.J. April 16, 2007 at 1-2.
37 Michael Orey, The Supreme Court: Open for Business-The Roberts Court is Showing
a Willingness to Referee Corporate Concerns, Bus. WK., Jul. 9, 2007, at 30; see also,
Patti Waldmeir, Investors Angry as Supreme Court Refuses Help, FT.coM, July 1, 2007.
38 Shareholder Lawsuit Ruling A Boon?, CFO MAG., Jun. 21, 2007, at 6. ("Plaintiffs
attorney Barbara Hart of Labaton Sucharow & Rudoff, says that the Supreme Court
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because neither side believes they lost. Thus, the Court may have reached
its indirect goal to remain neutral in the perpetual clash between
shareholders and corporations. However, in doing so, it appears that the
Court may not have reached its intended goal of making the standard more
uniform.
A. A Ruling for the Plaintiffs
Attorney Jeffrey Barrack suggests that several parts of the decision
illuminate how the ruling is actually shareholder-friendly. 39 He points to
the fact that Justice Ginsburg specifically wrote "that the standard adopted
does not force a plaintiff 'to plead more than she would be required to
prove at trial. ''Ao Barrack suggests that this is the court leaning toward
helping shareholders get past the pleading stage. Also, Barrack suggests
that this intent is furthered by the Court's ruling that there does not have to
be an allegation of personal gain for the individuals who made the
misstatements.4 ' On its face, this makes it easier for the shareholders to get
a claim past the pleading stages. To not have to prove officers' and
directors' personal financial motive during alleged defrauding is one less
hurdle for the shareholders.
Christopher Keller and Michael Stocker state, "the Supreme Court
effectively dropped the bar as low as it could without eviscerating the
language of the 1996 pleading standard for securities cases under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. "42 Keller and Stocker say
that this decision is decidedly pro-plaintiff because the plaintiffs only have
to show that their side is as likely as any other explanation.43 Interestingly,
they say that the defendants are at a marked disadvantage because they can
only respond based on the facts alleged in the complaint and the documents
available to the public. Keller and Stocker state that the ruling
"unmistakably cabined the authority of Congress to restrict the access of
private securities fraud plaintiffs to the courts. ' '4
The Courts have also been divided as to whether or not the pleading
standard should favor the plaintiffs or the corporations. An example of a
case that resulted in a pro-plaintiff opinion is In re Converium Holding AG
decision 'is a finding for investors because the court articulated what [investors] need to
bring a case-a cogent set of facts that give rise to an inference of intent."'); see also
Patti Waldmeir, Companies and Markets: Supreme Court Curbs Actions Against
Companies, FINANCIAL TIMES USA, Jun. 22, 2007, at 13.
39 Jeffery A. Barrack, US. Supreme Court Renders Investor-Friendly Decision in
Tellabs, 236 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 41, 41 (2007).
40 Id.
41 Id. See also, Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2503.
42 Keller & Stocker, supra note 3.
43 Id.
44 Id
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Securities Litigation.45 In this case, the plaintiffs sued Coverium in
connection with its IPO. The plaintiffs argued that the company did not
honestly indicate its financial situation going into the IPO. 46 The plaintiffs
alleged fraud in their complaint. The defendants offered several pieces of
information as a matter of defense to their alleged bad behavior.4 7
However, this court did not find the several defenses sufficient to dismiss
the case. The court wrote, "In light of 'all of the facts alleged, taken
collectively,' the inference of scienter raised by the Lead Plaintiffs'
amended complaint is 'at least as compelling as any opposing inference one
could draw from the facts alleged,' including the inferences suggested by
Converium and the Officer Defendants in their motion to dismiss, as
described above. 48
Another example is Belizan v. Hershon from the District of
Columbia's Circuit Court.4 9  The circuit court vacated and remanded a
decision to dismiss the case for inadequate pleadings. The court suggested
that on remand, the district court should "consider whether plaintiffs'
amended allegations ... established an inference of recklessness 'at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent. ,, 50 Thus, it
is clear that at least some of the courts are reading the Tellabs opinion as
one that is to favor the plaintiffs.
B. A Ruling for the Corporations
On the other side of the spectrum, many have thought that the
Tellabs ruling was actually a victory for businesses. A headline in
Financial Times Asia on the day of the decision sums up perfectly the
immediate sentiment of many. The headline read, "One More Big Win for
Wall Street-Supreme Court does its Bit for US Competitiveness. ,,5 On
August 16, 2007, the Financial Advisor ran a piece by James Spellman,
who runs a strategic communications firm in Washington, D.C. Mr.
Spellman stated that with Tellabs, "The Justices imposed higher demands
45 In re Converium Holding AG Securities Litigation, No. 04 Civ. 7897 (DLC), 2007
WL 2684069, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
46 Id., at *1.
41 Id., at *3.
48 Id. (citing Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-10).
49 Richard D. Bernstein & Frank M Scaduto, Lower Courts' Handling of 'Tellabs'
'Inference ofScienter, 'N.Y.L.J Dec. 11, 2007 at 4 citing Belizan v. Hershon, 495 F.3d
686, (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Bernstein & Scaduto call this "the one significant instance so far
of an appellate court not affirming dismissal of securities claims under Tellabs.")
(emphasis added).50 Belizan, 495 F.3d at 691.
51 One More Big Win for Wall Street-Supreme Court does its Bit for US
Competitiveness, 51 FINANCIAL TIMES AsIA, Jun. 21, 2007, at 8.
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on investors seeking redress in securities fraud cases. 52 He continued by
quoting a statement made by Goodwin Proctor, "The Supreme Court's
opinion in Tellabs will become an argument in every [defense] lawyer's
arsenal for seeking dismissal of a securities fraud class action case at the
outset."53  The Executive Vice-President of the National Chamber
Litigation Center of the United States Chamber of Commerce, Robin
Conrad, agreed with Goodwin Proctor. Conrad stated, "[b]y adopting a
standard that weeds out baseless allegations of securities fraud, today's
Supreme Court decision will go a long way in reducing abusive securities
class actions, discouraging blackmail settlements and providing greater
certainty for the financial industry and investors., 54 These practitioners
clearly read the Tellabs decision as an asset to corporations and their
defense.
Some of the legal discussion about how Tellabs has played out in
the courts so far also indicates that people feel it is undoubtedly pro-
corporation.55 For example, one reporter wrote, "The lower courts seem to
agree that Tellabs does indeed make it harder for plaintiffs to plead
scienter. ' '5 6 The reporter then points to several cases that the lower courts
dismissed in favor of the plaintiffs based on a Tellabs analysis. 57 However,
this analysis is limited to cases in which the corporation reworked its
accounting after the alleged fraud. The article argues, "it appears that when
52 Spellman, supra note 5, at 1.
531d. at2.
54 Stephen Labaton, Investors' Suits Face Higher Bar, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
22, 2007, at 2.
55 Steven Wolowitz & Joseph De Simone, Did 'Tellabs' Raise PSLRA Scienter Bar?,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 2007, at S3. (These practitioners argue, "Unsurprisingly, many of [the
post-Tellabs references] come in decisions dismissing complaints for not having met
the PSLRA's pleading standard for scienter."); Wolowitz & De Simone cite ATS1
Communs., Inc. V Shaar Fund,493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding "that a 'strong
inference' of fraudulent intent could not be raised by a simple allegation that an
otherwise legitimate investment vehicle 'creates an opportunity for profit through
manipulation."'), Winer Family Trust v. Queen, No. 05-3622, 2007 WL 2753734 (3rd
Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) (concluding that the other possible explanations for the
misstatements were enough to make the accusatory statements "neither 'cogent' nor
'compelling."'), and Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 495 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2007).
56 Bernstein & Scaduto, supra note 49 at 4.
57 Bernstein & Scaduto, supra note 49 at 4. Their article compiles a strong list of cases
that have been dismissed for pleading defects in light of Tellabs. This list includes:
Globis Captial Partners, L.P. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 2007 WL 1977236, at *3 n.l
(3rd Cir. July 10, 2007), Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 495 F.3d 753 (7th Cir.
2007), WeinerFamily Trust v. Queen, 2007 WL 2753734 (3rd Cir. Sept. 24, 2007),
Central Laborers" Pension Fund v. Integrated Electrical Services Inc., 497 F.3d 546
(5th Cir. 2007), In re BearingPoint Inc. Securities Litigation, 2007 WL 2713906, (E.D.
Va. Sept. 12, 2007), Caiafa v. Sea Containers Ltd., 2007 WL 2815633 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
25, 2007), Roth v. OfficeMax, Inc. 2007 WL 2892634 (N.D. Ill. Sept 26, 2007),
Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 2007 WL 2254693 (N.D. Ga. July 18, 2007), In re H&R
Block Securities Litigation, 2007 WL 2908649 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 2007).
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a corporation investigates allegations of wrongdoing, it decreases the
chances that scienter may be inferred., 58  Inherently, this reduces the
implication of scienter. If the executives changed their statements on their
own accord, they are more likely to have not been trying to cover
something up. Therefore, it seems pretty obvious that these cases would
naturally side with the defendants. Bernstein and Scaduto's point, though,
is not solely that the cases came out in favor of the defendants, but rather,
that it was because of Tellabs' heightened pleading standard that the alleged
scienter could no longer be strong enough when the corporation had
changed its announcements or prospectuses.
Bernstein and Scaduto paint a rosy picture of the real aftermath of
Tellabs. However, looking at the big picture shows that the media and
commentators were clearly split over the negative and positive impact of
Tellabs.
C. Key Equity and Tellabs on Remand
One of the most convenient ways to see how the Tellabs ruling is
actually playing out is to look carefully at a circuit court decision that has
taken Tellabs into consideration. Even within the same courts, the judges
do not agree whether Tellabs made the standard more or less difficult for
the plaintiffs to meet at the pleading stage. Sarah Gold and Richard
Spinogatti suggest that it is "likely that Tellabs' mandate-to consider all of
the possible inferences the alleged facts suggest-may not ultimately
produce as clear, uniform, and predictable a body of securities law as the
Supreme Court might have hoped., 59 Gold and Spinogatti's article points
to the Key Equity Investors, Inc. v. Sel-Leb Marketing Inc. case, decided on
September 6, 2007, to make this point. They seem to hit the mark with this
illustrative assessment of the confusion that came from Tellabs.
The Third Circuit, which probably would have aligned with the
Second Circuit's pleading standards previous to the Tellabs ruling, changed
its tune in light of Tellabs.60 In Key Equity the Third Circuit granted the
Sel-Leb's motion to dismiss, claiming that the shareholders had not met
their pleading burden to show scienter. 61 In this case, the shareholders
alleged "that Sel-Leb falsified its earnings to maintain its credit line," in
addition to several other complaints.62 The Third Circuit court, using
Tellabs, explained that these were not strong enough allegations, and that
they did not have sufficiently particular facts to make a "strong inference"
58 Bernstein & Scaduto, supra note 49.
59 Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Post-Tellabs: Inference of Scienter in Eye of
the Beholder, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 2007 at 3 [hereinafter Gold &Spinogatti].60id.
61 Key Equity Investors, Inc. v. Sel-Leb Marketing Inc, 2007 W 2510385, 6 (3rd Cir.
2007) ; see Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 59.62 Key Equity Investors, 2007 WL 2510385 at 5.
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in terms of what the Tellabs case established.63 The court also says in a
footnote, "With this allegation alone, an inference that defendant's
renegotiated Sel-Leb's credit line in the ordinary course of business (when
it was up for renewal) is more likely than an inference of scienter."64 This
analysis is where the Third Circuit is really applying the new Tellabs
standard.
Yet, the extremely potent dissent in Key Equity shows the nuances
of Tellabs. In his dissent, Judge Garth makes it clear that he thought that
Key Equity had met its pleading burden. Garth stated that because Key
Equity alleged that Sel-Leb would have defaulted on its credit and that the
directors hid that fact in their statement of "renewal," the plaintiffs had met
the burden to show facts establishing a "motive and opportunity" to commit
fraud.6 5 Garth also points to a Sixth Circuit case, PR Diamonds, Inc. v.
Chandler66 that allowed a similar pleading to stand before Tellabs.67 Garth
suggests that because the strict and corporation-friendly Sixth Circuit had
not dismissed that case before Tellabs, this indicates that these similar
pleading facts really should be enough to support a cause for scienter.
Either way, it is clear that Tellabs did not make the decision any easier for
the Third Circuit court.
If Gold and Spinogatti are correct that Key Equity is a potent
example of how courts across the nation are going to continue to interpret
Tellabs, it would appear that those who argued that it was a pro-corporation
ruling were correct. With seemingly adequate facts, the Third Circuit
managed to rule in favor of the corporation despite a very compelling
opposition.
However, this trend never actually materialized. On remand, the Seventh
Circuit took another look at Makor Issues & Rights, LTD v. Tellabs Inc.
bearing in mind the new standard established in Tellabs.68 The Seventh
Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and did not allow the case to be
dismissed at the pleading stage. The court said, "The inference of corporate
scienter is not only as likely as its opposite, but more likely . .. if there are
only two possible inferences, and one is much more likely than the other, it
must be cogent." 69  Thus, the plaintiffs have finally made it past the
pleading stage and will continue on toward trial. Despite the supposedly
critical opinion from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit has not
changed its tune in regards to the facts of Makor. The Tellabs ruling was
neither strong enough nor different enough, to reverse the Seventh Circuit's
63 Id. at 6.
64Id. at5.
61 Id. at 10.
66 PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671 (6"h Cir. 2004).
67 Key Equity Investors, 2007 WL 2510385 at 11.
68 Makor Issues & Rights, LTD v. Tellabs Inc, 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Makor
I1").6 9 Id., at 710.
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ultimate opinion. It seems that despite the goal, the debates in the courts
will remain contentious because of the Tellabs ruling.
IV. THE ISSUES THAT REMAIN
This Note has attempted to establish that it is still very difficult to
rule whether securities pleadings are sufficient. However, this is not the
only downside of the much anticipated ruling. In addition to the lack of
clarity, several other issues remain open regarding securities scienter
pleading.70 These issues existed before the Tellabs ruling, but for the most
part they seem to have been ignored. The ruling may have exacerbated
them.
A. Group Pleading
One of the things that will become particularly interesting is how
the juxtaposition between the group pleading issue and the courts instituting
Tellabs will play out.7 1 In Makor, the Seventh Circuit said that plaintiffs
must plead the allegations of scienter to all the defendants. The Circuit
Court ruled, "to proceed beyond the pleading stage, the plaintiff must allege
as to each defendant facts sufficient to demonstrate a culpable state of mind
regarding his or her violations., 72 The Seventh Circuit did not think it
adequate to say that any misstatement applied to all defendants7 3  The
Supreme Court expressly stated in Tellabs that they were not going to deal
with this issue, as neither side brought it up.7
4
The idea behind the group pleading doctrine is that publications
made by the corporation, can be assumed to be made by all the officers and
directors.75 This doctrine makes things easier on the plaintiffs because they
70 Previously cited authors have pointed out the issues that could arise. As with the
previous part of the Note, this author is simply synthesizing the information. See,
Wolowitz & De Simone, supra note 55, Bernstein & Scaduto supra 49, Keller &
Stocker, supra note 3, and Sara S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Group Pleading
Suffers Another Blow, N.Y.L.J, Dec. 12, 2007 at 3.
" See generally William 0. Fisher, Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie: The Rise
and Possible Demise of the "Group Pleading" Protocol in lOb-5 Cases,56 Bus. LAW.
991 (2001); Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities
Litigators Need to Know, 68 Bus. LAW. 1281, 1330 (2007); and Kevin M. O'Riordan,
Clear Support or Cause for Suspicion? A Critique of Collective Scienter in Securities
Litigation, 91 MiNN. L. REv. 1596, 1609-14 (2007).
72 Makor, 437 F.3d at 603.
73 Note that the Seventh Circuit spent a large part of its opinion on remand discussing
the group pleading or collective intent aspect of the case. Makor II, 513 F.3d at 707-08.
74 Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2511.
71 See Wolowitz & De Simone, supra note 55, and Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 59.
(Gold & Spinogatti's article reviews the splits among the circuits and suggests that
eventually something is going to have to be done about the different applications. The
authors acknowledge that many hoped the Court would address it in Tellabs. Gold &
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do not have to plead with particularity against each defendant. Historically,
different circuit courts have approached this question in their own
respective manners7 6 Tellabs certainly did not make this an easier decision
or even one that is moving toward uniform application among the different
circuits.
Bernstein and Scaduto make an interesting suggestion about how
some of the courts are dealing with the group pleading issue. They note
that in In re Openwave Systems Securities Litigation the court allowed
some of the plaintiffs' complaints to make it through to the next stage of
litigation and denied others'.7" They state, "The difference [about whether
they make it through or not] appears to turn on the extent to which plaintiffs
pleaded specific allegations of an individual's direct personal benefit versus
generalized allegations based on an individual's title or office. 78 It seems
that at least in this circuit, group pleading did not meet the new Tellabs
standards for alleging scienter. The Supreme Court chose to ignore the
opportunity to rule on this, and therefore created an even larger ambiguity.
B. Outside Sources
Another securities pleading issue arising from Tellabs is the debate
over what outside sources may be used in determining whether the
complaint survives a motion to dismiss. 79 The majority opinion in Tellabs
stated that "the courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as
other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice" (emphasis added). 80 As a general rule, the Supreme Court stressed
that "all the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference
of scienter." 81 Given this express ability to analyze outside sources when
determining if there is a strong inference of scienter, this was an important
Spinogatti also acknowledge how the group pleading standard really affects securities
litigation. They wrote, "By permitting plaintiffs to avoid having to identify each act or
omission of a defendant with particularity ... the group pleading doctrine. . . certainly
appears inconsistent with Congress' intent to substantially heighten the pleading
requirements in securities class action lawsuits.").
76 See Wolowitz & De Simone, supra note 55 (noting that the Third, Fifth and the
Seventh Circuits do not allow group pleading anymore, and that it appears that the
Eleventh Circuit has also said in light of the PSLRA that there can be no group
pleading; on the other hand, Wolowitz & De Simone state that the Second, Sixth and
D.C. Circuits do still allow group pleading in light of the PSLRA.).
77 Bernstein and Scaduto, supra note 49.
78 Id.
79 See generally Susan E. Hurd, Tellabs Lesson, DAILY DEAL, Aug. 7, 2007, at 2.
80 Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509.
81id
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part of the decision. Even Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion,
suggested that the majority opinion actually gets rid of some level of the
pleading particularity requirements by allowing the courts to look at each
and every allegation including those not necessarily directly pleaded.83
One article, "Tellabs Lesson," notes how important this part of the
Tellabs opinion is to the overall scheme of securities litigation. The article
states, "A defendant's ability to rely on other source materials has proved
very important in these cases for establishing competing inferences., 84 The
article indicates the Court would have made a major misstep had it not
allowed for the inclusion of outside documents. It argues, "The Reform Act
[PSLRA] would be severely undercut if a plaintiff's claims could survive in
the face of opposing inferences readily available from undisputed matter of
public record. 8 5 One reporter believes the outside sources are necessary to
reduce frivolous lawsuits.
In the Court's defense, they did suggest that ambiguity in the
pleadings will hurt the plaintiff.86 However, how is this really possible if
they are allowed to include things that are specifically of public record? By
definition it is impossible to plead with particularity something that is not
actually in the complaint and simply relied on by common knowledge.
Keller and Stocker believe that even with the inclusion of outside
sources in making an allegation for scienter, the defendants are at a
disadvantage because they are still limited to these outside sources and to
the facts alleged in the complaint.87 However, this just reinforces the
ambiguity of the Tellabs holding. Keller and Stocker are suggesting that
because plaintiffs only have to make it "as likely as any other inference,"
the fact that the defendants hands are "tied" with what they can claim in
defense makes it a decision that is pro-plaintiff.88 Yet, from the other side,
it seems as though the fact that the corporate defendants can include things
that are common knowledge proves they are actually at an advantage when
trying to find something that would be "at least as likely" to show their
innocence as their guilt. It is simple statistics; the more opportunities you
have, the better the chance that one will work.
This is especially interesting when you look at it in connection with
smaller companies. It seems that smaller companies would have fewer
outside sources for the courts to include in their evaluation to help absolve
the smaller company of allegations of fraud or deceit.8 9 If this is a true
82 Hurd, supra note 79.
83 Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2516, (Alito, J., concurring).
84 Hurd, supra note 79.
85 Id.
86 Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2511; Hurd, supra note 79 at 2.
87 Keller & Stocker, supra note 3.
88 Id.
89 This is not necessarily a fact. However, if the company is smaller, it is going to file
less paper and most likely will be covered less in the news.
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issue it appears that smaller corporations do not benefit from this aspect of
the Tellabs holding.
C. Recklessness
It should be noted that the court refused to acknowledge the
"recklessness" question that has plagued securities litigation. 90  While
delving into this area of the securities law is a topic for another note
entirely, it would be unjust to not mention the "recklessness" issue as one of
the things that Tellabs did not clear up but potentially could have.
V. DISSENT
Justice Stevens' dissent presents an interesting and important
perspective that should not be overlooked. Justice Stevens agrees that the
Court needed to create a judicial interpretation of "strong inference" in
order to further the goal of protecting defendants' privacy, time and money
by not allowing frivolous cases to make it past the pleading stage. 9'
However, Justice Stevens argued that there is a more workable standard that
should be applied in security cases.92
The majority opinion attempts to make a semi-absolving statement
that they are not making the plaintiff do anything that they would not have
to do at trial.93 However, at trial the plaintiff would have the benefit of
discovery in which they could get to the documents needed and be able to
articulate exactly why they were defrauded. This is similar to saying that
you cannot bring a claim unless you are certain that you will win it. The
semantics of the Tellabs opinion are clearly causing a lot of issues. In light
of this, it seems that Justice Stevens' suggestion might have been a better
option.
Justice Stevens suggested that the 'probable cause' standard that is
applied in criminal cases should be applied as the scienter pleading standard
for "strong inference., 94 Justice Stevens supports his claim by saying, "It is
most unlikely that Congress intended us to adopt a standard that makes it
more difficult to commence a civil case than a criminal case.",95 In light of
the semantic mush that comprises the majority opinion, this is a refreshing
perspective. Justice Stevens points out just how unclear the standard of
"strong inference" from the majority opinion is, when he points out that
even the majority justices do not agree on the definition of the words that
90 Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2507.
9'Id. at 2517, (Stevens, J. dissenting).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2513.
94 Id. at 2517 (Stevens, J. dissenting); see also, 68 AM. JUR. 2d Searches and Seizures §
181 (2007) (providing background on probable cause).
95 id.
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they used to create the definition of "strong inference." 96 Justice Stevens
seems to be thinking outside the world of securities and more in the world
of civil procedure. It is quite possible that Justice Stevens's suggested
definition could have avoided some of the chaos that has ensued since the
supposedly clarifying Tellabs decision.
Justice Stevens suggested that using his 'probable cause' standard
would avoid the "unnecessary conclusion that 'in determining whether the
pleaded facts give rise to a 'strong' inference of scienter, the court must
take into account plausible opposing inferences."'' 97 Justice Stevens even
went so far as to suggest that specifically, the Tellabs case should not be
dismissed at the pleading stage. He states that when the Court uses his
probable cause analysis, "the truth of the detailed factual allegations
attributed to 27 different confidential informants described in the complaint
... I think it clear that they establish probable cause to believe that Tellabs'
chief executive officer 'acted with the required intent.' 98 Speaking
specifically of the allegations regarding "channel stuffing," 99 Justice
Stevens makes a very poignant point when he states, "If these allegations
are actually taken as true and viewed in the collective, it is hard to imagine
what competing inference could effectively counteract the inference that
Notebaert and Tellabs 'acted with the require state of mind."" 00 Given the
issues that were not ironed out by the Tellabs ruling, it seems that Justice
Stevens's definition could be beneficial or at least a guide for the lower
courts.
The goal of this Note is to point out what we should be aware of in
the future and issues that will probably surface in light of the Tellabs ruling.
A standard that is more established and has a better foothold in the minds of
today's judges would have been an easier ruling to apply.
VI. WHY IS THE TELLABS RULING IMPORTANT FOR SMALL BUSINESSES?
There are a few reasons why the ruling will be relevant to small
businesses. First of all, the ruling affects all businesses that are subject to
the Securities Acts, and that includes many small businesses. Whether or
not corporations are going to be hurt by this ruling is probably not going to
be completely evident for a couple of years, and therefore it will remain an
important part of securities litigation.
96 Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Suggesting that Scalia's
concurrence really is a different approach and not the same definition that the majority
aproved in its opinion.).
9Id
98 Id.
99 In its Tellabs opinion, the Supreme Court described "Channel Stuffing" as a practice
of"flood[ing] its customers. with unwanted products. Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2505.
'00 Id. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In addition to the regular effects that Tellabs is going to have on
every public company in America, it has the potential to strike small
businesses in a different fashion. For example, one of the important points
that came from Justice Ginsburg's majority ruling regarded how courts
should interpret ambiguities and omissions in plaintiff's pleadings for lOb-5
cases. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "We agree that omissions and ambiguities
count against inferring scienter, for plaintiffs must 'state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."10 1  By explicitly stating that omissions and
ambiguities are a real mark against a plaintiffs pleading, the Court may
have unintentionally disadvantaged small business shareholders.
It seems logical that smaller businesses have fewer public
announcements. This makes it more difficult for shareholders of smaller
businesses to gain the information that they need to make adequate
pleadings. Therefore, when a shareholder of a small business goes to make
their pleading it is potentially more difficult for that shareholder to plead
with the required specificity to meet the Tellabs' heightened standard of
ruling against pleadings with omissions and ambiguities.
This seems like a negative consequence toward the small business
shareholders, but when you look at it in light of much of the rest of the
securities regulation it probably is a positive consequence. Many of the
smaller businesses are severely hampered by the new securities regulations
because they require a lot of expensive disclosure to meet the requirements
to remain a public company. 102 However, the manner in which omissions
and ambiguities are now to be dealt with provides smaller businesses with a
quasi-protection mechanism. By making it more difficult to meet the
requirements, Tellabs is protecting small businesses.
However, there is one more facet to contemplate here. While the
lack of information could help corporations by putting more pressure on the
shareholders, it could hurt smaller corporations at the same time. There is
less information that could be exonerating in light of the willingness for the
courts to include anything that is incorporated by reference as well as
pleaded. 103
The third fashion in which the small public corporations are
affected by this ruling is demonstrated partially by an article by Margaret
Sachs.10 4  Sachs argues in general that underclass investors, whom she
classifies as "those trading in inefficient markets without an advisor,"'105 are
"' Id. at 2511.
102 Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies
Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 707, 719 (2005).
103 Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509.
104 Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The case for Replacing 'The
Reasonable Investor' with the 'The Least Sophisticated Investor' in Inefficient Markets,
81 TuL. L. REV. 473, 481 (2006).
"o5 Id. at 476.
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hurt by the current state of the materiality laws as established in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.10 6 and Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 10 7 These
cases use the "reasonable investor" standard to determine if an omission or
a misstatement is "material."10 8  Sachs then argues for "an alternative
materiality standard for inefficient markets."' 0 9  She suggests that the
alternative materiality standard should be based on the "least sophisticated
investor."' 10 However, Sachs says that the alternative standard should only
be allowed "if the defendant acts with heightened scienter-that is, with
actual knowledge of the fraud's likely deceptive effect.""' Sachs wants to
trade materiality for scienter on a sliding scale.
Sachs suggests that we need to heighten the scienter requirement if
we lower the materiality requirement for "underclass investors," giving
them an opportunity to bring their claim. Sachs, suggesting that scienter
and materiality are linked, states, "The likelihood that the defendant was
merely reckless declines as the absurdity of his misrepresentation
increases."' 12
It seems possible that the Tellabs ruling has done just the opposite
of what Sachs suggested for small businesses. As Sachs defines underclass
investors as "those trading in an inefficient market"" 3 and generally
inefficient markets are composed of small businesses, this theory could
therefore affect small businesses. Sachs wants to help underclass investors
by lowering the materiality standard. She offsets this by suggesting a
heightening of the scienter standard. However, Tellabs, may have lowered
the scienter standard and therefore, hurt underclass investors. For example,
the majority decision suggests that there does not need to be specific
evidence of financial motive in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a lOb-5
pleading." 4 This makes it easier for shareholders to point out fraud and
prevail on the immediate claim. In effect, not having to prove financial
motive lowers the extent of scienter needed on that issue.1 5 For small
businesses this does not seem to make a difference at the outset, but if you
look at how that is linked to materiality it becomes evident that it could
affect the smaller companies.
This really is going to be an issue if it can ever definitively say that
the pleading standards were raised or lowered with the Tellabs ruling.
106 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
107 Basic v. Levinson 485 U.S. 224 (1988)..
108 Id.
'09 See Sachs, supra note 104, at 481.
110 Id.
i11 Id.
112 Id.
113 See Sachs, supra note 104, at 476.
114 Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2511.
"15 The plaintiff still has to meet the requirements of Tellabs. This is not suggesting that
the overall case made pleading scienter easier.
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Thus, this third theory is probably not going to be an issue until the court
speaks again. Tellabs was not clear enough to make it an imminent issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
It appears that Tellabs was an intelligent decision in that both
corporations and shareholders think they won. However, it remains
important to recognize that inconsistencies still exist and Tellabs failed to
clear up some prevalent securities law issues. The Supreme Court may
have achieved its objective of remaining neutral, but it has certainly failed
to give a clear path for securities practitioners and federal judges.
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